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I. General Survey
The year 1995 showed steady progress in economic integration efforts in the
Asia-Pacific region.
The Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) was the only region-wide
intergovernmental cooperation scheme established in 1989. In 1995, APEC mem-
bers held their seventh ministerial meeting from November 16 to 17, followed
by the third informal economic leaders' meeting (summit meeting) from Novem-
ber 18 to 19, at Osaka, Japan. Both meetings reconfirmed and continued APEC's
members' commitment to regional liberalization set out in the 1994 Bogor Decla-
ration.1 In these meetings, APEC members reaffirmed their original goals, such
as flexibility and voluntariness, for their diverse membership, rather than a more
rigid, compulsory arrangement. The Philippine president will implement these
programs this year.
Subregional arrangements in the Asia-Pacific region also showed steady prog-
ress. The Association of Southeast Asia Nations (ASEAN) continued to enhance
regional cooperation. The single most significant event about ASEAN may have
been the accession of Vietnam, still a socialist state, on July 28. Still another
significant event occurred in 1995. The United States and Vietnam resumed
diplomatic relations on August 5. During ASEAN's fifth summit meeting at
Bangkok on December 14 and 15, ASEAN finally extended membership to the
Union of Myanmar, Cambodia, and Laos, bringing the membership total to ten.3
Members also issued the Bangkok Declaration on December 15 to accelerate and
expand their internal liberalization efforts under the ASEAN Free Trade Area
(AFTA).4 They agreed to reduce regional tariffs to 0 to 5 percent by the year
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2000 (the deadline was originally 2008, and later, 2003).' They also agreed to
eliminate nontariff barriers at the regional level and to expand their liberalization
efforts into service sectors. However, the final outcome of these decisions still
remains to be seen.6
On the other side of the Pacific Ocean, Ministers in charge of trade from
thirty-four countries in the Americas met in Denver on July 1, reconfirming their
commitment to establish a free trade area of the Americas (FTAA) by 2005. The
outcome of this meeting also remains to be seen.7
Asian and European countries agreed to a summit meeting in Bangkok in March
1996.8 The Singaporean Prime Minister first proposed this meeting in October
1994 to encourage dialogue on Europe's accusation of social dumping. 9 The
hidden agenda for this meeting is probably to develop cooperation among APEC's
East Asian members and to exclude North America, Australia, and New Zealand.
The ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), a forum for security issues at the regional
level, held its second meeting at Brunei on August 1 to discuss issues such
as the Spratly Islands.'l Several countries established ARF in 1994, including
ASEAN, the United States, Canada, the European Union (EU), Japan, South
Korea, Australia, New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, China, Russia, Laos, and
Vietnam. ARF's structure is different from most regional security forums in the
Asia Pacific area. For instance, ARF, as in the Helsinki process, includes the
major powers. Therefore, the group is different from a traditional alliance or
security arrangement, which presupposes a confrontation or containment strategy
against potential enemies. ARF is not a rigid security framework, but rather
a discussion forum and a consultative scheme, without any dispute settlement
mechanism.
II. APEC: Trends and Perspectives"
A. BASIC TRENDS IN THE APEC PROCESS
12
Australia first proposed APEC in 1988, and the organization has encouraged
cooperation in the Asia-Pacific region since its establishment in November 1989.
APEC formed as the result of many factors. First, the increasing economic inter-
dependence among countries in the region encouraged dialogue and cooperation.
5. Id.
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The trade among countries in the region was vertical, consisting of both industrial-
ized countries and natural resource suppliers. Industrialized countries such as
the United States and Japan were centers of vertically linked trade networks.
This structure was significantly different from those used in less diversified re-
gions such as the European Community (EC). Each country must participate
equally to establish a certain level of reciprocal or mutual interdependence. Other-
wise, the arrangements will differ, as in the Lom6 Convention's development-
oriented or assistant-oriented arrangements. The current members of APEC still
trade under this vertical structure due to the diversity of their development.
However, they are beginning to establish a comprehensive arrangement similar
to that of the EC. Also, successful economic development has encouraged some
small countries to participate in a regional framework, thus avoiding domination
by the major economic and political powers in the region. In fact, some developing
countries are the most provocative members in the discussion on the future of
APEC. The reallocation of economic power within the region is, along with its
overall economic dynamism, a main motivating factor for a regional arrangement.
The diminishing Cold War element in the region also provided momentum
for APEC's progress. The end of the Cold War is much less apparent in Asia
than in Europe. In Asia, ideological confrontations still remain. However, the
collapse of the former Soviet Union has, without doubt, changed the strategic
environment of the region; and, more importantly, the introduction of economic
pragmatism by some socialist countries, such as Mainland China and Vietnam,
is creating a background for practical economic cooperation among ideologically
different but economically integrating countries.
Although APEC originally dealt with economic matters, members today are
increasingly involved in policy matters. This emphasis on policy includes APEC's
denunciation of other regional arrangements that could undermine the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)-World Trade Organization (WTO)
multilateral liberal trade regime. Moreover, APEC is becoming a symbol of
cooperation in the whole region, including East Asia, Southeast Asia, and North
America. Without this policy of cooperation, mutually exclusive agreements,
such as the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), will probably
develop. Therefore, APEC always symbolizes the link between these geographi-
cally and culturally divisible regions. Against this diverse background, APEC
is a unique group of regional arrangements.
Although a regional arrangement, reflecting the economic, cultural, and politi-
cal diversity among its members, APEC is also a universal arrangement. There-
fore, future plans for APEC require the same considerations as those for universal
international organizations, such as the WTO. First, APEC may base its internal
cooperation on economic pragmatism rather than cultural and psychological ties
among members. Second, APEC should remain open to outsiders. Third, APEC
could become a flexible and expansive arrangement, maintaining its current fo-
rum-like looseness. This element could change, however, depending upon the
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development of the institution. Fourth, APEC should continue to be a complex
of subregional, multidimensional elements, comparable to that of NAFTA, the
Australia-New Zealand Free Trade Arrangement, an expected AFTA by ASEAN
members, and small economic free zones.
APEC members set out their present direction in their third ministerial meeting
at Seoul in 1991 by adopting the Seoul APEC Declaration. This declaration
included the following goals: (1) regional growth and the achievement of common
interests for the region's inhabitants, (2) the strengthening of a multilateral free
trade framework in a global sense, and (3) the internal liberalization of trade
and investment compatible with the GATT principles.13 Based upon these princi-
ples, the declaration stipulated two methods of cooperation: (1) respect of mutual
interests, by considering different stages of economic development and different
social and political systems, and (2) open dialogue and consensus by respecting
all members' views. 14 Therefore, APEC clearly recognizes divergence among
members, including their different stages of economic development and different
social and political systems.
APEC also intends to use the free trade principal to maintain the nations'
economic development. The free trade principle has two aspects, the promotion
of internal liberalization of trade and investment and the maintenance of free trade
with outside economies. APEC can achieve this second aspect by maintaining its
compatibility with GATT-WTO principles. Specifically, APEC can expand its
liberalization process using the most-favored-nation principle (MFN). However,
just how APEC will achieve GATT-WTO compatibility in the process of further
development remains unclear. Regional arrangements almost always have a nega-
tive effect on the GATT-WTO framework. At present, various movements toward
regional integration have progressed, creating a protectionist effect against outside
economies.
Also unclear is the issue of how some APEC members' style of economic
development can be integrated in the GATT-WTO framework. The postwar
period has seen constant discussion on how underdeveloped countries can achieve
economic development, and these discussions have greatly affected the GATT-
WTO regime. Another issue is how regional arrangements such as APEC can
cope with rapidly growing economies. If East Asian countries have different
patterns or styles of economic development, and if such patterns are useful for
others, incorporating these patterns into the legal framework of regional arrange-
ment, and finally into the WTO regime, way prove useful. This attempt could
be an alternative to the largely unsuccessful development initiatives in the post-war
period.
13. APEC Secretariat, Selected APEC Documents 1989-1994 (1995), 1991 Seoul, Joint State-
ment, Seoul APEC Declaration.
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B. APEC's PROGRESS BEFORE 1995
1. The First Canberra Ministerial Meeting (1989)15
APEC members held the inaugural ministerial meeting at Canberra in 1989.
These members included the United States, Canada, Japan, Korea, Australia,
New Zealand, and ASEAN. The main achievement of the meeting is its very
holding. The Joint Statement after the meeting was full of rather negative points,
which the APEC process should avoid. These points included the avoidance of
forming a trade bloc in the region by ensuring consistency with the GATT rules.
The members also avoided a decision on any particular structure, since this
decision was premature at that stage. APEC was a modest consultative forum
for the exchange of views and research, not a rigid institution.
APEC maintained and extended its commitments to open multilateral trading,
regional diversity, including differing social and economic systems and current
levels of development, and, finally, work programs. APEC's statement mentioned
programs on (1) economic studies, (2) trade liberalization, (3) investment, tech-
nology, and human resources, (4) reviews of data on regional trade flow and
development, and (5) trade, investment, and technical transfer opportunities. 16
The statement also expressed APEC's desire to involve the People's Republic
of China, Taiwan, and Hong Kong in its membership.
2. The Second Ministerial Meeting at Singapore (1990)17
The second meeting at Singapore clarified APEC's goals. The Joint Statement
set trade liberalization and regional cooperation as APEC's main objectives. The
Statement clearly said that regional liberalization was desirable, "so long as
any such liberalization was consistent with GATT principles and was not to the
detriment of other parties."" Thus, the Statement prohibited protectionism and
therefore observance of the MFN principle under GATT.
During this meeting, APEC ministers also prepared the Declaration on the
Uruguay Round.1 9 The Declaration of the Uruguay Round was probably APEC's
first outward policy declaration, and demonstrated its shared interest. Ministers
also agreed on the framework of work projects, which included (1) review of
trade and investment data, (2) trade promotion and programs, (3) investment and
technical transfer in the region, (4) multilateral human resource development,
(5) regional energy cooperation, (6) marine resource conservation and prevention
of marine pollution, and (7) telecommunications.2 °
15. APEC Secretariat, Selected APEC Documents 1989-1994 (1995), APEC Ministerial Meet-
ings, 1989 Canberra, Joint Statement, Specific Elements of a Work Program.
16. Id.
17. APEC Secretariat, Selected APEC Documents 1989-1994 (1995), APEC Ministerial Meet-
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3. The Third Ministerial Meeting at Seoul (1991)21
The meeting at Seoul was significant for its development of APEC's subsequent
activities and structure.22 Ministers clarified APEC's objectives and procedures by
their Joint Statement and APEC Declaration. In the Joint Statement, "Ministers
endowed APEC with a clear international personality.', 23 The meaning of' interna-
tional personality" in a legal sense is not totally clear, but at least APEC may have
become an independent entity at the international level 24 The Statement also recon-
firmed APEC's commitment to the GATT rules, saying that members would pursue
"trade liberalization within APEC on a GATT-consistent basis and not to the detri-
ment of others." The Statement also set out and authorized the complete list of
work programs, consisting of ten schemes, including the above-mentioned seven
tasks and adding three additional tasks: fisheries, transportation, and tourism.
APEC members also considered "the possibility of establishing a mechanism of a
permanent basis to provide support and coordination for APEC activities at various
levels." 25 This statement led to the establishment of APEC's secretariat in the fol-
lowing year. The APEC Seoul Declaration may be the most significant document
in the process so far. The Seoul Declaration clearly stipulated the objectives of
APEC, consisting of (a) economic development, (b) economic liberalization,
(c) multilateral trading, and (d) trade and services, "in a manner consistent with
GATT principles, where applicable, and without detriment to other economies."
2 6
The Declaration also stipulated (a) the principle of mutual benefit, taking into ac-
count the diversity in the region, and (b) open dialogue and consensus building
among members 27 The Declaration also set out guidelines for participation, includ-
ing: (a) new participants should have strong economic links in the region, (b) they
should accept the objectives and principles of APEC, and (c) all participants will be
involved in decision making. 2' The Seoul Declaration also called for (a) an annual
ministerial meeting to determine the direction, nature, and implementation of
APEC's activities, (b) a senior officials' meeting to develop the APEC process in
accordance with the decisions of the ministerial meetings, and (c) a work program,
organized by a working group.29
In the Seoul meeting, the three Chinas (the People's Republic of China, Taiwan,
and Hong Kong) participated for the first time. Ministers again made the Declara-
tion on the Uruguay Round.
21. APEC Secretariat, Selected APEC Documents 1989-1994 (1995), 1991 Seoul, Joint State-
ment, Seoul APEC Declaration, Declaration on the Uruguay Round.
22. 2(1).
23. Id.
24. Chapter Eleven, Legal Status, SCHERMERS, INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONAL LAW, 770
(1980).
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4. The Fourth Ministerial Meeting at Bangkok (1992)30
The fourth meeting basically followed the previous meeting, adding some
important institutional developments. The meeting established the secretariat in
Singapore, though its scale is small. In the Bangkok Declaration on APEC Institu-
tional Arrangements, Ministers gave the secretariat "such legal capacity as is
necessary for the exercise of its functions.'3 '' This legal capacity may mean the
legal function in Singaporean domestic law, rather than in international law.
The parties also agreed that APEC needed a budget to cover administrative and
operation costs.3 2 This budget is also modest, reflecting some members' opposi-
tion to any strong institutional arrangement. Ministers also agreed to establish
a small eminent persons' group as an advisory body, consisting of academics. In
the Joint Statement, Ministers particularly mentioned subregional arrangements,
such as NAFTA and AFTA, and said that "APEC should encourage investment
linkages, regional and subregional trade arrangements to be outward-looking and
GATT-consistent." 3 3 This statement probably stems from concerns about the
development of subregional arrangements during the year.
On the membership issue, "APEC was entering a phase when consolidation
and effectiveness should be the primary considerations, and the decisions on
further participation required careful consideration in regard to the mutual
benefits to both APEC and prospective participants." 34 Thus, as is common
in regional arrangements, APEC began to balance expansion of participants,
on the one hand, against effectiveness of operation, on the other. As a result,
APEC became less enthusiastic about increasing its membership to enhance
its effectiveness. Members again issued the Declaration on the Uruguay Round
in the meeting.35
5. The Fifth Ministerial Meeting and the
First Leaders' Meeting at Seattle (1993)36
The meetings at Seattle reconfirmed APEC's objectives, particularly the
commitment to regional trade liberalization. Therefore, the Seattle meetings
30. APEC Secretariat, Selected APEC Documents 1989-1994 (1995), APEC Ministerial Meet-
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probably did not create a new era for APEC. An informal leaders' meeting
also reconfirmed the APEC objectives, though leaders, in their statement,
envisioned "a community of Asia pacific economies."" Leading did make
some important arrangements. First, the leaders agreed to hold the Finance
Ministers' meeting at a later date. This delay was a departure from the previous
attitude toward financial matters; but national financial authorities, particu-
larly in the United States and Japan, were reluctant about the APEC process.
These authorities claimed that economic policy coordination should use ex-
isting models such as the G7 process. Financial authorities still opposed eco-
nomic policy coordination via the APEC process, thus excluding this area
from the Economic Trends and Issues group.
Second, members established the Pacific Business Forum (PBF) as an advisory
forum, "comprised of two private sector representatives, including one represent-
ing small and medium business, from each member." 38 The PBF submitted their
report at subsequent meetings, mainly based upon overall business concerns.
Third, members decided to develop a nonbinding code of principles covering
investment issues, which they promulgated the following year.39
Ministers also reconfirmed APEC's basic principles. Both the Joint State-
ment and the Declaration on an APEC Trade and Investment framework called
for GATT consistency, consensus-building, flexibility, and diversity. 40 Minis-
ters made some institutional changes. First, the Committee on Trade and
Investment (CTI) replaced the previous informal group on regional trade liber-
alization (RTL) to fully pursue the reduction of "barriers to trade in goods
and services and investment among participants in a manner consistent with
GATT principles and without detriment to other economies." 41 Second, mem-
bers established the group on economic trends and issues (ETI) "to propose
a direction that will engage a productive dialogue that will examine possible
area of economic cooperation without extending into the realm of economic
policy coordination."-
42
On the membership issue, Ministers agreed to defer consideration of additional
members for three years. In the Seattle meeting, Ministers admitted Mexico and
Papua New Guinea, and Chile joined the following year. Members also issued
the Declaration on the Uruguay Round, which put pressure on the EC and led
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6. The Sixth Ministerial Meeting at Jakarta and the Second Leaders' Meeting
at Bogor (1994)43
The 1994 meetings showed some important progress in cooperation, though the
members maintained their original goals of GATT-consistency and intraregional
diversity. In the APEC Leaders' Declaration of Common Resolve, leaders agreed
to the goals of regional liberalization and established specific deadlines." APEC
members should achieve free and open trade and investment by the year 2020.
The deadline for industrialized economies is 2010 and the deadline for developing
economies is 2020. This commitment was a political declaration rather than a
binding legal agreement.45 Specific details of this liberalization program are not
clearly established; therefore its legal impact remains uncertain.
If the program's final goal is to create a free trade arrangement, the deadlines
of 2010 or 2020 might prove problematic. The WTO rule of regional arrangement
stipulates a transition period of ten years as its goal. APEC should prove the
necessity for its longer period of transition. If APEC's goal is merely as partial
liberalization, APEC should extend liberalization to nonmembers on a MFN
basis, as under the WTO rule. Leaders stated that their goal is "the actual reduc-
tion of barriers among APEC economies but also between APEC economies and
non-APEC economies," but added to that non-APEC developing countries would
"benefit from the trade and investment liberalization in conformity with GATT-
WTO provisions." 46 The latter sentence is unclear, but the rule is that any partial
liberalization at a regional level shall extend to all outsiders, no matter whether
they are developed or developing countries. APEC should clarify this statement.
The declaration also gave special treatment to developing members by saying
that, with regard to the initiation and implementation of a cooperative arrange-
ment, "those that are not yet ready to participate may join at a later date." 47
The declaration did not clarify which members deserve such special treatment.
Leaders also agreed to examine the possibility of a voluntary consultative dispute
mediation service to supplement the WTO dispute settlement mechanism, though
its details are not final.
Another achievement in the meetings was the adoption of the APEC Nonbinding
Investment Principles, which outline principles for regional investment based
upon liberalization and fairness. This document stipulates that non-APEC invest-
ors should be treated equally with APEC investors and with indigenous investors
43. APEC Secretariat, Selected APEC Documents 1989-1994 (1995), Leaders Meetings, 1994
Bogor, Leaders Declaration of Common Resolve, APEC Ministerial Meetings, 1994 Jakarta, Joint
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under the principles of nondiscrimination and national treatment. Further specifi-
cation and implementation of these principles remains to be seen.4
The Minister's Joint Statement initiated several institutional changes. First,
the Ad Hoc Group on Economic Trends and Issues, established primarily for
economic review and analysis, became the Economic Committee. 49 Each group
seems to progress from a working group to an ad hoc group, and finally to a
committee, as in this case. Second, members established the Budget and Adminis-
trative Committee (BAC), which is in charge of budgetary issues and operational
and administrative efficiency commensurate with the institutional development
of APEC ° Third, Ministers established two subcommittees, the Subcommittee
on Standards and Conformance and the Subcommittee on Customs Procedures,
both of which will be under the Committee on Trade and Investment. 51
C. THE PROGRESS IN 199552
In 1995, APEC held the seventh ministerial meeting and the third leaders'
meeting in Osaka, Japan. These Meetings generally reconfirmed existing APEC
principles, while also showing the start of the liberalization program under the
Bogor Declaration. Members reconfirmed the principle of voluntary liberaliza-
tion. Members also reiterated that APEC remains consistent with the WTO
agreements and retains flexibility in actual implementation. Leaders also agreed
on the need for an APEC dispute mediation service, though details are still unclear.
Leaders set January 1997 as the start of the overall implementation of the
action plans for liberalization and facilitation. To achieve this goal, they set out
a general framework for implementation in the Action Agenda, and demonstrated
their commitment to this Agenda by offering preparatory liberalization and facili-
tation in the Initial Actions. The Action Agenda is also a reconfirmation of existing
principles, such as WTO consistency, nondiscrimination, and flexibility. The
Agenda reconfirmed that "the outcome of trade and investment liberalization in
the region will be the actual reduction of barriers not only among APEC economies
but also between APEC economies and non-APEC economies." 53 The Agenda
also stipulated that "considering the different levels of economic development
among the APEC economies and the diverse circumstances in each economy,
flexibility will be available in dealing with issues arising from such circumstances
in the liberalization and facilitation process (facilitation includes supplementary
measures for liberalization, such as harmonization, standardization and the cre-
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possible liberalization and facilitation in each sector, with additional attention
to subregional arrangements, by saying, for instance, that members considered
"extending on a voluntary basis, to all APEC economies the benefits of reductions
and eliminations of tariff and nontariff measures, derived from subregional ar-
rangements. '
55
With regard to trade in services, a general harmonization or mutual recognition
of standards and procedures is evident in sectors such as telecommunications,
transportation, energy, and customs. The need for harmonization in the areas of
competition policy, intellectual property rights, and the rule of origin is also
obvious. Members created agreements for the settlement of disputes between
governments and private entities. 6 The business sector may have requested these
agreements, as shown in the Pacific Business Forum report. 7
The Joint Statement also reconfirmed principles such as voluntaries and WTO
consistency. The statement also reiterated that cooperation is the main pillar of
APEC activities, along with liberalization programs, by specifically saying that
"Ministers stressed the need to further promote economic and technical coopera-
tion in order to achieve sustainable growth and equitable development in the Asia
Pacific region. ,
58
On the institutional side, Ministers generally agreed to strengthen the secretar-
iat, but delegated its specific planning to the Senior Officials' meetings.5 9 With
regard to the participation issue, leaders also instructed the Senior Officers to
continue to consider APEC's policy on new membership and observer status.
60
Finally, members established another new organization, the APEC Business
Advisory Council (ABAC) as requested by the Pacific Business Forum. 61 This
Council may strengthen the influence of business concerns in a formal way within
the APEC process, but, on the other hand, may hinder neutral, independent, and
perhaps efficient business involvement.
D. LONGER-TERM PERSPECTIVES OF APEC's PRINCIPAL ISSUES
1. The Scope of APEC
a. The Membership
As have other regional arrangements, APEC needs to balance the effectiveness
of its arrangements, on the one hand, and the increase of new participants, on
the other, with the progress of its detailed cooperation programs. The Seoul
55. Id.
56. Id.
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APEC Declaration in 1991 set out the general criteria for new members. However,
the Declaration also indicated that new participants would eventually be decided
by consensus among existing members. In general, effective cooperation requires
a certain level of equal economic performance; and a minimum development
level, along with economic interdependence, may be necessary before members
are admitted. This aspect is particularly important for APEC, whose diverse
membership may prove problematic in effective arrangements. However, politi-
cal considerations such as regional stability and conflict prevention suggest a
policy of broad inclusion, just as the ASEAN Regional Forum uses the principle
of comprehensive membership in the security area.
Another issue for APEC is whether to expand subregional arrangements. The
formation of NAFTA probably encouraged APEC to admit Mexico and perhaps
Chile as well. With the development of NAFTA and a wider free trade area of
the Americas initiative, the issue for APEC is whether new members of such
American arrangements should be automatically, or at least favorably, admitted
to APEC. The same issue is apparent in ASEAN with the participation of Vietnam
and the possible admission of other Indo-Chinese countries. If APEC is a compre-
hensive arrangement, as was the former LAFTA or LAIA in Latin America, a
certain level of parallel expansion between APEC and its subregional arrange-
ments might be understandable. However, if APEC is endowed with its own
programs, an automatic inclusion of subregional arrangements may not be reason-
able. This issue needs further consideration.
b. The Scope of Activities
Another debatable issue is which functional areas APEC should cover. Since
its inception, APEC has strictly limited its involvement in economic areas. Most
international cooperation schemes concentrate on the economic field, excluding
matters of politics and security. Economic cooperation is more straightforward
than political cooperation, which may touch the national sensitivities of each
participant or spark existing or potential political conflicts in a region. Economic
cooperation is also politically neutral and technically necessary, as demonstrated
in the development of international administrative cooperation in the Universal
Postal Union and the International Telecommunication Union. The EC is also
a notable example of how successful cooperation in the economic field has encour-
aged regional cooperation.
In the case of APEC, however, rigid, bilaterally based security networks al-
ready existed in the region, excluding the necessity for another new scheme.
The inclusion of political issues would have also discouraged the participation
of the three Chinas, which have particular political sensitiveness among them-
selves. But the clear distinction between economic and noneconomic fields is
increasingly difficult. Economic matters themselves have, more or less, a political
aspect; and, to achieve a stable regional arrangement, political aspects must be
covered. The EC has also gradually extended its scope, first informally, and
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later more formally, into a more political area. This creeping expansion might
take place in APEC, too. Currently, leaders' meetings strictly limit the discussion
to the economic field, but leaders may have to broaden the scope into noneconomic
areas. APEC meetings already include bilateral leaders' consultations and minis-
terial meetings, which draw no less attention than the formal APEC plenary
meetings. As early as 1992, in the keynote speech of the Bangkok ministerial
meeting, the Thai Prime Minster emphasized that "APEC, as a uniquely diverse
and open consultative forum, holds vast untapped potential for cooperation in a
broad range of areas, economic and otherwise," implying a wider political
arena. 62 APEC's own informality may encourage its expansion into economic
areas.
2. The Structure of APEC
APEC members agree that APEC should not seek a rigid institutional structure,
but should instead maintain flexibility and voluntariness. APEC uses a simple
structure, consisting mainly of ministerial meetings, a senior officials' meeting,
and a limited number of committees and working groups. The secretarial and
budgetary arrangements are quite limited to avoid a large bureaucracy. However,
with the development of APEC programs, the current loose structure might be-
come obsolete. Indeed, APEC has shown a steady institutional development,
such as the establishment of permanent committees, the establishment and possible
expansion of the secretarial and budgetary arrangements, and the creation of an
annual informal leaders' meeting. The issue of institutional expansion should be
examined in the context of the progress of APEC programs, including trade
liberalization and various facilitation measures.
However, the effectiveness of institutions is not easy to evaluate. Since its
inception, and the previous long-continued debate on a possible regional arrange-
ment, APEC's flexible, rather informal structure has been suitable for Asia-
Pacific cooperation. Leaders chose this flexible structure to promote efficient
management. APEC members preferred a flexible organization comparable to
that of the OECD over the rigid framework used by the EC.63 The OECD has
been relatively successful in coordinating members' policies, even without rigid,
binding legal instruments. Rather, peer pressure and mutual verification are fre-
quently the reasons for this efficiency. However, this mechanism works only
because the OECD is comprised entirely of countries with advanced economies
and therefore equal-footing and like-mindedness of members. This condition is
normally difficult to achieve, since APEC, in particular, is far from a group of
members of equal-footing. Therefore, to provide a reliable business environment
with predictability and stability, a relatively rigid mechanism may be necessary
to promote efficiency.
62. See supra note 30.
63. See supra note 11.
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3. The Process of the APEC Arrangements
a. Trade and Investment Liberalization
One of APEC's objectives has been liberalization at the regional level. At the
same time, consistency with the GATT-WTO rule has always been a main princi-
ple, along with flexibility. So far, APEC has not started the regional liberalization
program, but the issue to come is the balance between regional liberalization
and WTO-consistency. APEC has two choices: creation of a free trade area,
incompatible with the current WTO rule, or nondiscriminatory extension to non-
APEC countries, under the MFN principle. The 1994 Bogor Declaration set a
goal of regional liberalization by 2020. Whether the Declaration meant a free
trade arrangement or partial liberalization with the MFN extension to nonmem-
bers remains unclear. Realistically speaking, complete intraregional liberalization
will be difficult to achieve, considering the diversity of economic stages among
members. Also, APEC members will not automatically extend all intra-regional
liberalization to domestically sensitive nonmembers. The deadline of 2020 is
already far beyond the WTO's ten-year limit. APEC may use the principle of
voluntary liberalization as an excuse for the delay, claiming that any liberalization
is made on an individual basis and therefore has nothing to do with APEC itself.
Thus, each member decides whether regional liberalization should be extended
to nonmembers. If members act against the WTO rule, they have only themselves
to blame, not APEC. This approach may be difficult to sustain; and, sooner or
later, APEC will have to explain the legal ground for the delay in liberalization
programs.
Another unresolved issue is the treatment of subregional arrangements that
overlap APEC such as NAFTA, AFTA, and the free trade area of the Americas.
WTO rules do not distinguish between a relatively comprehensive regional ar-
rangement and a subregional arrangement. Therefore, any subregional arrange-
ments that overlap still satisfy the conditions stipulated in the General Agreement.
On the other hand, the relation between an umbrella arrangement such as APEC
and subarrangements such as NAFTA and AFTA might be difficult to coordinate
because their levels of liberalization differ. For instance, NAFTA has achieved
a more advanced level of liberalization than APEC, while AFTA has achieved
a lesser level of liberalization than APEC. This dichotomy might, in combination
with a rigid rule of origins, cause discriminatory treatment among members in
an umbrella arrangement, thus undermining the very goals of such an arrange-
ment. The increase of free trade arrangements, whether subregional or overlap-
ping, could lead to free trade at the global level; however, the increase could
just as well lead to further discrimination around the world. 6 4
64. C. Fred Bergsten, APEC and World Trade: A Force for Worldwide Liberalisation, FOREIGN
AFFAIRS 20 (May/June 1994).
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With regard to subregional arrangements in the Asia-Pacific region, another,
more political issue is the possible creation of an exclusive East Asian arrangement
as a unit in APEC. The Malaysian initiative of an East Asian Economic Caucus
(EAEC, originally named an East Asian Economic Group) remains controver-
sial. 65 This initiative is meant to counter NAFTA, which may have a protectionist
effect on other APEC members. The specific scheme of an EAEC is not clear.
However, the EAEC seems to be a forum for discussion among geographically
close economies in East Asia. The initiative in and of itself places strong pressure
on the APEC process, thus leading to an increasingly strong commitment to
regional liberalization.
b. Harmonization
An increase in trade invariably raises the issue of tariff and nontariff mea-
sures. In APEC, too, nontariff measures in major industrial sectors have been
on the agenda. The solution to nontariff measures may be their abolition or
at least their reduction. However, if measures are necessary for policy reasons,
a possible solution may be the prescription of nontariff standards at an interna-
tional level. This standardization is possible among countries with similar
economies, but APEC's diverse membership may have difficulty setting up
acceptable standards. Therefore, current APEC programs favor an approach
of mutual recognition of other members' standards and policies. The Action
Agenda for trade liberalization and facilitation, adopted in the Osaka meeting
in 1995, reflects this goal.
However, the diverse APEC members will not easily accept mutual recogni-
tion. Different administrative measures contain different policy considera-
tions. Different economic structures and developmental stages necessitate dif-
ferent economic regulations. Some advanced members' standards may be too
harsh for developing members, and some standards in developing members
may be unacceptably loose for advanced members. Developing members may
need stricter standards. APEC is considering the creation of common testing
and training for those in charge of regulative measures. Immediate harmony
and mutual recognition principles are not really feasible under the current
APEC programs.
c. Dispute Settlement
APEC is considering the creation of a regional dispute settlement mechanism
to supplement the WTO dispute settlement mechanism. The statement in Jakarta,
for instance, suggested that APEC's regional settlement mechanism should be
65. Low, The East Asian Economic Grouping, No. 4 THE PACIFIC REVIEW 4 (1991); Nigel
Holloway & Thorny Rowley, East Asian Trade Grouping at Top of Region's Agenda, An Insurance
Policy, FAR EASTERN ECON. REV. 52 (July 25, 1991); Malaysians Question APEC Goal, FINANCIAL
TIMEs (London), November 9, 1994, at 17.
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a mediatory body rather than a WTO legal settlement body. These ideas may
stem from members' concerns about recent economic disputes between the U.S.
and Asian economies, and members expect more efficient settlement by a regional
body. However, before APEC establishes a regional settlement mechanism APEC
must prove why this mechanism is more useful when operating separately from
the WTO process. APEC must consider the special character of disputes in the
Asia-Pacific region and whether members will observe regional solutions. In
establishing a nonlegalistic settlement mechanism such as a mediation system or
a more politically based settlement body, APEC must prove why such a non-WTO
mechanism will be suitable for Asia-Pacific conditions. Extra-legal dispute settle-
ment may be more efficient for Asian economies; however, an Asian-style dispute
settlement mechanism will probably not be effective in disputes among members
with different economic characteristics. The business sector may favor a relatively
legalistic approach to promote predictability or certainty in business activities.
E. THE FUTURE PROSPECTS FOR THE APEC PROCESS
APEC's future is still subject to debate, especially the issue of whether APEC
should maintain its flexible and open structure or introduce a more rigid and
closed style. APEC will most likely preserve its basic principles such as the
minimal institutional arrangement, the voluntary approach to liberalization, the
nondiscriminatory treatment, the consistency with the WTO, and the flexibility
based on economic diversity. However, at the same time, members will increas-
ingly introduce opposing principles. This phenomenon is already evident in,
for instance, the gradual progression toward a more rigid form, such as the
regularization of informal leaders' meetings (in a way, formalization of informal
meetings), the increase in committees, and the incremental expansion of the
secretarial and the budgetary arrangements. The restrictive attitude toward admis-
sion of new members, based on the concern for APEC's effectiveness, may be
a symptom of expected closeness. On the other hand, APEC may, as have other
institutions, expand its scope of activities. Leaders' are already using APEC's
informal structure to turn meetings into more comprehensive discussions, cov-
ering both economic and noneconomic matters. A newly established dispute settle-
ment mechanism might increase its jurisdiction on noneconomic matters, under
the guise of vague APEC directives. The members themselves are certainly de-
manding a forum with broad coverage in the region, including coverage of social
matters, security aspects, and human rights issues, though APEC presently avoids
these areas. However, APEC will enhance the cooperative mood in the region,
particularly through its frequent consultations and cooperative activities. Institu-
tionally, too, APEC's action-oriented programs will increase the need for a more
reliable institutional arrangement, and this increase will be largely achieved
through a similar creeping expansion of APEC institutions. Therefore, APEC
will become another example of an evolving group of regional arrangements.
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III. The Association of Southeast Asia Nations: Trends and Perspectives 66
A. ASEAN's EARLY HISTORY6 7
Five foreign ministers from Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore, the Philippines,
and Indonesia established ASEAN in 1967 by signing the Bangkok Declaration.
The main objectives set out in the declaration were, first, "to accelerate the
economic growth, social progress and cultural development," and, second, "to
promote active collaboration and mutual assistance on matters of common interest
in the economic, social, cultural, technical, scientific and administrative fields."
61
Therefore, ASEAN's aim has been economic cooperation and development, as
well as cooperation in other fields. The creation of ASEAN was not necessarily
logical, considering the diversity of the five original countries. Due to their
former colonial ties, each of the five was separately linked to or depended upon
an external power. A clear identity as ASEAN, or Southeast Asia, probably did
not exist at the beginning. ASEAN was, as other organizations of that era, a
creation of the Cold War, supported by the United States to promote political
and economic ties at the regional level. Consequently, ASEAN's early era was
not markedly successful in terms of cooperation.
ASEAN members attempted to remedy this early stagnation in the wake of
the end of the Vietnam War in 1975. How the war's end influenced cooperation
among ASEAN members is not totally clear, but cooperation probably stemmed
from fear of the communist camp and domestic instability. Thus, they held the
first heads of government's meeting at Bali in 1976, where they signed the Decla-
ration of ASEAN Concord and the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast
Asia. Members also established a secretariat in Jakarta. In the following year,
they signed the ASEAN preferential trading arrangements for trade liberalization.
However, their first real achievement was their political cooperation during the
unstable period after the Vietnam War. In the wake of the Vietnamese invasion
of Cambodia in 1978, ASEAN members successfully formed a common position
against the Vietnamese-backed government in Cambodia and elsewhere, includ-
ing the UN. Their strong pressure finally led to the withdrawal of Vietnam, and
subsequently encouraged the resolution of the Cambodian conflict. ASEAN's
success as a political group probably created the image of a relatively well-
66. WOLFANG MOELLERS & ROHANA MAHMOOD, eds., ASEAN, FUTURE ECONOMIC AND PO-
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organized body. Internally, their policy towards the Cambodian issue and other
common regional problems, such as the Indochina refugees, may have encouraged
a sense of cooperation among the members. This progress is an example of
political cooperation encouraging policy integration in the economic area.
B. ASEAN's POLITICAL COOPERATION69
ASEAN's cooperation on the political side is seen in their internal consultation
at the head-of-the-government level or ministerial meetings, where they discuss
common issues and try to reach an accord. Members have cooperated well so
far, dealing cautiously with the issues presented. Such issues have included, in
the early period, the Indochina conflict and the consequent refugee problem, and
recently the effect of external powers such as China upon the Spratly Islands
territorial disputes. During this process, ASEAN has become a political group,
though their real solidarity is doubtful, considering their diversity.
ASEAN's political significance has another element. This element is the organi-
zation's role as a key unit in a wider regional context. ASEAN's relatively high
institutionalization and strategic importance now provide a means for Asia-Pacific
political consultation, though these consultations are still at an embryonic stage.
From 1984 on, ASEAN foreign ministers collectively consulted with outside
foreign ministers on various issues, both economic and political, after that
ASEAN foreign ministers' meetings. This consultation is the so-called ASEAN
Post-Ministerial Conference, and the dialogue partners are Australia, Canada,
the EC, Japan, Korea, New Zealand, and the United States. In 1993, APEC
leaders enlarged these discussions by establishing the ASEAN Regional Forum
(ARF), a forum held at the Post-Ministerial Conference to discuss regional secu-
rity issues. Therefore, ASEAN is developing regional political cooperation.
Another reason for ASEAN's recent success is ASEAN's political activity,
motivated by the economic performance of each member-country. In 1995, the
ARF meeting showed steady progress of this process. 70 At this meeting, members
decided that political activity would enhance ASEAN's confidence building, pre-
ventive diplomacy, and dispute settlement. Participants agreed on the establish-
ment of two subgroups, a confidence building group and a peacekeeping group.
The parties also discussed some sensitive regional issues such as the Spratly
Island dispute.
C. ASEAN's ECONOMIC COOPERATION
71
Generally speaking, ASEAN has been politically successful and economically
inactive. 72 ASEAN's difficulties are common to other economic cooperative
69. Id.
70. See supra note 10.
71. See supra note 66.
72. Id.
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schemes in the Asia-Pacific region. ASEAN's first obstacle is the diversity in
its members' developmental stages and economic structures, which hinders eco-
nomic and political cooperation. The lineup of ASEAN members is as diverse
as the states in the Asia-Pacific region. The group includes highly developed and
particularly small countries such as Singapore, newly industrialized countries
such as Malaysia and Thailand, underdeveloped economies such as Indonesia,
small Opec-type resource-dominated states such as Brunei, and recently, Socialist
countries such as Vietnam. This variety will increase with the participation of
other Indo-Chinese countries, which have agricultural, less industrialized, econo-
mies.
ASEAN's second obstacle to regional cooperation is its traditional link with
external economic powers, even though ASEAN's outward-looking stance contri-
butes to its economic success. Recently, ASEAN members are also deepening
their economic ties with newly industrialized economies in Northeast Asia, and
ASEAN members themselves are becoming active investors in less developed
countries in Asia.73 Therefore, ASEAN probably does not really need rigid inter-
nal economic arrangements.
ASEAN's economic cooperation could become a successful example of mutual
cooperation between countries with many levels of economic development. How-
ever, economic cooperation may not be necessary, since ASEAN seems to succeed
without it.
1. Trade Liberalization Plans-The Preferential Trading Arrangements (PTA)
and an ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA)
ASEAN's plan for regional trade liberalization started at the same time as its
active political cooperation. In 1977, ASEAN foreign ministers concluded their
preferential trade agreement (PTA), which was the first attempt to achieve trade
liberalization among members. The agreement grants preferential tariff rates
to members. Therefore, this arrangement violated the GATT requirements for
legitimate regional arrangements. Furthermore, the agreement is insufficient as
a regional trade liberalization scheme. The PTA's rule of origin requirement,
whereby products must contain at least 50 percent ASEAN content to qualify
for preferential treatment, greatly limited the PTA. This rule shows that the
arrangement was motivated by a regional import-substitution development strat-
egy, rather than open trade and investment goals. Members tried to minimize the
impact of the scheme by excluding protected products. Members also considered
granting preferential treatment to nontraded products, but probably did not imple-
ment the preferential treatment scheme.
The 1992 establishment of an ASEAN free trade area, consisting of the
agreement on the common effective preferential tariff (CEPT) will probably end
73. Id.
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this stalemate. The AFTA plan is notably more ambitious and stronger than
before.
First, CEPT greatly improved the economic performance and economic inter-
dependence of ASEAN members. The effective free trade arrangements generally
require a certain level of intragroup trade and proper economic activities. There-
fore, chances are better this time for a regional trade arrangement.
Secondly, CEPT encouraged ASEAN countries to shift to a more liberal and
export-oriented approach to trade than before. Before CEPT, ASEAN emphasized
import-substituting economic development, a protectionist scheme at both the
regional and individual level. AFTA still has some protectionist elements, but
its overall stance is more liberal, focusing on enhancement of trade and foreign
investment.
Third, CEPT contributed to a further cooperative trend. This trend is enhanced
by the successful formation of an external political pressure group. ASEAN
recently created local economic zones across several countries, and their success
provided another motivating force for economic cooperation at the intergovern-
mental level. Singapore, which includes Southern Malaysia (Johor) and Eastern
Sumatra, is a prime example of these successful economic zones.74
Fourth, the recent trend of forming or strengthening regional trade arrange-
ments in other parts of the world has also been an important motivation to ASEAN
members. The proliferation of regional free trade arrangements, such as the
European integrated market and the North American Free Trade Area, influence
or even threaten ASEAN. Projects in other regions, including those in less devel-
oped countries such as Latin America, tend to have the same effect.
These influences on ASEAN also affect Asia-Pacific in general, including
APEC. APEC sometimes uses ASEAN's trade plan as a model, including its
prospects and difficulties.
The heart of AFTA is its plan for intratrade liberalization by common effective
preferential tariffs. The plan for liberalization is multilayered and flexible, re-
flecting the diverse economic development of ASEAN members. AFTA set out
a timetable for this plan. Within fifteen years of January 1, 1993, all intraregional
tariffs will be phased down to 0.5 percent and nontariff barriers on most manufac-
tured products will be eliminated. Fifteen product groups, including less sensitive
products, will be on a fast track, achieving tariff reduction in ten years (for lower
tariff goods, seven years). However, sensitive products are excluded from this
plan. Sensitive products include unprocessed agricultural goods and services and
products restricted for the protection of national security, health, and cultural
tradition (the restriction of this latter category should be temporary, subject to
review after eight years). The implementation of this scheme still remains to be
seen, and further difficulties may surface, considering the economic conditions
74. Id.
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and the trade policies of some members. The interaction between the AFTA
scheme and the APEC plan will be interesting.
AFTA acceleration is also important. The fifth ASEAN summit in 1995 moved
the target date for tariff reduction (to 0-5 percent) from 2003 (originally 2008)
to 2000. By 2003, tariffs should be reduced to 0 percent, and AFTA will expand
its liberalization into service sectors. AFTA members also agreed upon regional
cooperation for intellectual property policy. 75 However, the outcome of this com-
mitment still remains to be seen.
AFTA parallels APEC in many ways. Both agreements deal with the conditions
they face, such as the economic diversity among members and the need for
export-oriented economic development. Therefore, the AFTA project could be-
come a model for subsequent APEC plans.
AFTA's trade liberalization scheme is a multilayered, progressive, flexible
program that explicitly excludes sensitive products. This exclusion results from
the difficulties inherent in a straightforward perfectionist liberalization scheme.
ASEAN also needs a flexible structure, and a trade arrangement by ASEAN
members should be multilayered.76 This arrangement could be established by
first forming a customs union of four similarly developed members, namely
Thailand, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Indonesia. Second, this customs union
would form a free trade area with Singapore, while still maintaining the union
as a unit. In this free trade arrangement, the scope of liberalization will be limited
to ASEAN-originated goods. Finally, ASEAN should undertake a special negotia-
tion and trade agreement with Brunei. Now, Vietnam will be treated in the same
way as Brunei. ASEAN members claim that they will make efforts to expand
their AFTA liberalization to outsiders. How this commitment is related to the
legal obligation of MFN treatment under the GATT is not clear, but this ambiguity
may also be common to APEC's commitment to the MFN principle. The re-
maining issue in AFTA's protectionist approach is the rule-of-origin requirement.
Although this requirement is becoming less stringent, the agreement requires
that goods must contain at least 40 percent ASEAN components to qualify for
the CEPT scheme.
AFTA has several safeguard measures built into its liberalization scheme.
Article 6 of the agreement says that "member countries are allowed to suspend
provisionally the CEPT preferences if rapidly growing imports cause serious
injury to sectors producing like or directive competitive products." 77 This intra-
regional safeguard is a reflection of the flexible, thus incomplete, approach of
AFTA, and could become a model for the APEC scheme.
75. See supra note 7.
76. Hans Christopher Rieger, ASEAN: A Free Trade Area or a Customs Union? 132 FAR EASTERN
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77. See supra note 66.
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As for harmonization at the regional level, AFTA has not yet drawn up any
concrete plans. Concerns about nontariff barriers could lead to new efforts to
harmonize technical standards among members. However, further progress in
trade liberalization remains to be seen.
Finally, AFTA has a dispute settlement provision. Article 7 says that "differ-
ences between member countries are to be settled amicably between the parties
concerned.- 78 The meaning of this provision is not totally clear, but the provision
does demonstrate ASEAN's preference for a consensual approach as opposed to
a legalistic approach. For instance, the AFTA Council will interpret the CEPT;
and, if necessary, the ASEAN economic ministers will review the Council's
decisions.7 9 This approach to dispute settlement should also be discussed in the
planning of APEC.
2. Industrial Cooperation Schemes"
Through trial and error, ASEAN also attempted a regional industrial coopera-
tion scheme. However, ASEAN's industrial projects have encountered problems
common to those used in other regions.
Governmental industrial policies always run the risk of becoming harmful, or
at least meaningless, to private manufacturers. ASEAN's economic development
has been largely motivated by private initiatives, based upon the market mecha-
nism. Therefore, governmental intervention in industrial policy might negatively
influence such flexible private economic activities. Governmental plans, which
are generally large-scaled, may also restrict the proper development of small
and middle-sized enterprises, the main economic actors in ASEAN countries.
Governmental intervention also tends to have a protectionist effect, putting a
damper on foreign multinational enterprises whose investment contributes greatly
to ASEAN's economic development.
Furthermore, regional industrial arrangements may be influenced by govern-
mental political or social preoccupations to the detriment of private economic
activities. In industrial plans, most decisions, such as the allocation of resources
and the setting-up of plants, are political. Political decisions are seldom economi-
cally reasonable.
These concerns influenced ASEAN's industrial planning and intensified its
private, noninterventionist, outward-looking character. In 1980, ASEAN began
its first industrial project (ALP), which tried to assign large-scale industrial proj-
ects to different member countries. These projects have generally failed because
the private sector refused to cooperate. Therefore, ASEAN's next project, the
ASEAN industrial complementation scheme, established in 1981, is more pri-
vately motivated. The project encouraged cooperation among member countries
78. Id.
79. Id.
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in the production of particular brands, also called the brand to brand complementa-
tion (BBC). The BBC has considerable cooperation from the ASEAN Chamber
of Commerce in identifying and promoting projects. ASEAN gave the products
under this project privileged treatment.
ASEAN's latest project is even more liberal and flexible. The ASEAN indus-
trial joint ventures (AIJV) in 1983 utilized tariff preferences as investment incen-
tives and encouraged joint ventures with foreign companies. Joint ventures only
needed two ASEAN members to qualify, and non-ASEAN equity could be up
to 49 percent (later raised to 60 percent). In addition, the local content of products
must be at least 51 percent. With all this improvement in ASEAN industrial
schemes, governmental planning may not be necessary.
However, during 1995 ASEAN's industrial cooperation scheme did not pro-
gress. Regional enterprises opposed the scheme as governmental intervention.
ASEAN's industrial cooperation may fade away, without any significant achieve-
ment, leaving private initiative and foreign investment as the main motivators
for development.8"
81. See supra note 6.
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